Liability changes everything
Bruce Schneier - 20.11.2003
Computer security is not a problem that technology can solve. Security solutions have a technological component, but security is fundamentally a people problem. Businesses approach security as they do any other business uncertainty: in terms of risk management. Organizations optimize their activities to minimize their cost-risk product, and understanding those motivations is key to understanding computer security today.
It makes no sense to spend more on security than the original cost of the problem, just as it makes no sense to pay liability compensation for damage done when spending money on security is cheaper. Businesses look for financial sweet spots -- -adequate security for a reasonable cost, for example -- and if a security solution doesn't make business sense, a company won't do it.
This way of thinking about security explains some otherwise puzzling security realities. For example, historically most organizations haven't spent a lot of money on network security. Why? Because the costs have been significant: time, expense, reduced functionality, frustrated end-users. (Increasing security regularly frustrates end-users.) On the other hand, the costs of ignoring security and getting hacked have been, in the scheme of things, relatively small.
We in the computer security field like to think they're enormous, but they haven't really affected a company's bottom line. From the CEO's perspective, the risks include the possibility of bad press and angry customers and network downtime - none of which is permanent. The result: a smart organization does what everyone else does, and no more. Things are changing; slowly, but they're changing. The risks are increasing, and as a result spending is increasing.
This same kind of economic reasoning explains why software vendors spend so little effort securing their own products. We in computer security think the vendors are all a bunch of idiots, but they're behaving completely rationally from their own point of view. The costs of adding good security to software products are essentially the same ones incurred in increasing network security - large expenses, reduced functionality, delayed product releases, annoyed users - while the costs of ignoring security are minor: occasional bad press, and maybe some users switching to competitors' products. Any smart software vendor will talk big about security, but do as little as possible, because that's what makes the most economic sense.
As scientists, we are awash in security technologies. We know how to build much more secure operating systems. We know how to build much more secure access control systems. We know how to build much more secure networks. To be sure, there are still technological problems, and research continues. But in the real world, network security is a business problem. The only way to fix it is to concentrate on the business motivations. We need to change the economic costs and benefits of security. We need to make the organizations in the best position to fix the problem want to fix the problem.
Liability enforcement is essential. Remember that I said the costs of bad security are not borne by the software vendors that produce the bad security. In economics this is known as an externality: a cost of a decision that is borne by people other than those making the decision.
Today there are no real consequences for having bad security, or having low-quality software of any kind. Even worse, the marketplace often rewards low quality. More precisely, it rewards additional features and timely release dates, even if they come at the expense of quality.
If we expect software vendors to reduce features, lengthen development cycles, and invest in secure software development processes, they must be liable for security vulnerabilities in their products. If we expect CEOs to spend significant resources on their own network security - especially the security of their customers - they must be liable for mishandling their customers' data. Basically, we have to tweak the risk equation so the CEO cares about actually fixing the problem. And putting pressure on his balance sheet is the best way to do that.
This could happen in several different ways. Legislatures could impose liability on the computer industry by forcing software manufacturers to live with the same product liability laws that affect other industries. If software manufacturers produced a defective product, they would be liable for damages. Even without this, courts could start imposing liability-like penalties on software manufacturers and users.
This is starting to happen. A U.S. judge forced the Department of Interior to take its network offline, because it couldn't guarantee the safety of American Indian data it was entrusted with. Several cases have resulted in penalties against companies that used customer data in violation of their privacy promises, or collected that data using misrepresentation or fraud. And judges have issued restraining orders against companies with insecure networks that are used as conduits for attacks against others. Alternatively, the industry could get together and define its own liability standards.
Clearly this isn't all or nothing. There are many parties involved in a typical software attack. There's the company who sold the software with the vulnerability in the first place. There's the person who wrote the attack tool. There's the attacker himself, who used the tool to break into a network. There's the owner of the network, who was entrusted with defending that network. One hundred percent of the liability shouldn't fall on the shoulders of the software vendor, just as one hundred percent shouldn't fall on the attacker or the network owner. But today one hundred percent of the cost falls on the network owner, and that just has to stop.
However it happens, liability changes everything. Currently, there is no reason for a software company not to offer more features, more complexity, more versions. Liability forces software companies to think twice before changing something. Liability forces companies to protect the data they're entrusted with.
Bruce Schneier is founder and CTO of Counterpane Internet Security, Inc. His latest book is Beyond Fear: Thinking Sensibly About Security in an Uncertain World. He can be reached at http://www.schneier.com/
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