Lest We Forget

The war in Yugoslavia has demonstrated the war of the future

It has been often said that history should be mistrusted, especially when it's warm. Although it's only been half a year since bombs began falling on the rump Yugoslavia, enough time has passed nevertheless to take at least a preliminary look at what happened. This not only provides us with a general overview of the conflict, but also enables us to determine what lies ahead as we get ready to cross over to the Third Millennium. The importance of the war in Yugoslavia is not so much that it was the first European war in over half a century, or the last such European conflict on the eve of the Millennium, but the way in which computer mediated communications have supposedly changed our perceptions of how wars are now fought.

A Retrospective Glance

The war in Yugoslavia was the first European war in 54 years, and although it was limited to an air campaign, at times it looked as though it would escalate. Yet behind all the jargon of "ethnic cleansing" lingers the neglected issue of nationalism. As Anne-Marie Thiesse, writing in Le Monde Diplomatique[1], aptly pointed out, in the dispute over who "owns" Kosovo, both Serbian and Albanian nationalists have brandished arguments from history going back to antiquity or the Middle Ages. The fact that such petty nationalist rivalry could lead to an international crisis reflects the failure of neo-liberalist politics and the "new world order". It also attests to the difficulty of forging new collective identities in the face of post-Cold War nationalism.

In many ways, the war in Yugoslavia was blown out of proportion. The scale of the tragedy in Kosovo, in global terms at least, is not that big. The reason it has taken center stage is because "the west" still can't come to terms with nationalist conflicts in their midst. Consequently, NATO's inability to act in a decent and civilised manner is merely a testament to how impotent western diplomacy really is.

As a result, swift attacks, begun by greatly superior forces and achieving their purpose within a few days, seems to be politically and militarily the only effective style remaining for conventional war. Yet in the case of Yugoslavia, with the country's military forces based on a tradition of partisan warfare[2], such superior forces, backed up by the most sophisticated weapon systems, succeeded in only "hitting air" and served to merely postpone an unavoidable political settlement.

This is because new and sophisticated weapons scarcely affect the principles of guerrilla warfare: poorly equipped but well-organised guerrillas have always been at a disadvantage in firepower and they make it their business to be absent when a massive attack is launched against them.

Guerrilla warfare is a politically motivated form of resistance in non-developed countries, nationalistic in nature and directed against foreign influences in the rule of the guerrilla's own country. If it matches the aspirations of the general population, it will tend to prosper and the only plausible strategy against well-organised guerrillas involves long and costly attrition in infantry engagements -destroying an idea by all those who hold it.

Guerrilla warfare can be rightly called the "poor man's power". The problem is that neo-liberalist politics and globalist economics is perpetuating a framework of guerrilla warfare on a vast, global scale. With the poor of the under-developed and developing nations tending to become poorer, and with continuing interference by developed countries in the affairs of nations, the prospect is of an endless series of guerrilla wars in Latin America, Africa, Asia, and even Europe (i.e., the Balkans).

This is made worse by the ways in which the use of computer-mediated communications in intelligence, control systems, and the media is affecting the character of international relations. Because of the speed of computer-mediated systems, local incidents are known instantly and decisions are made at the highest levels. For this reason, swift military solutions seem to be more appropriate than old-fashioned diplomacy. Not only this, but as these computer-mediated systems continue to evolve and become more refined, not only are events known instantly, they are even anticipated. Consequently, a policy of pre-emptive strikes to forestall the actions of an adversary has become the guiding principle toward international relations.[3]

The end result of all this was foreseen decades earlier by a group of internationally known scientific and military experts.[4] A stage was envisioned when leaders who have to implement a decision to strike will be worse informed than the computer systems from which their information is based. Accordingly, they will have no choice but to follow proposals generated for them and based solely on masses of computer-processed intelligence data.

It seems we have already reached such a stage, one in where computers have, in a sense, come to govern human affairs -- and lead us into war. Not only this, but the conduct of war itself is likewise determined by computers. Automatic systems designed and programmed by engineers have not only replaced the political and military judgement of national leaders; the automation of warfare and the possibilities for attack from great distances also dehumanises military operations. This, in turn, whittles away any remaining sympathy for the suffering of one's enemies which, in the framework of modern warfare, is made up mostly of unarmed civilians.[5]

All of this is subsequently perpetuated within a vortex of nationalism and the misplaced objectives of a neo-liberalist world order. There is no doubt about the association between personal insecurity and nationalism -- the security one feels within a national identity and its irrational corollaries of racism and chauvinism. Not only has globalisation fuelled feelings of personal insecurity on a local level, but the use of new and frightening weapons adds to this insecurity on a broader, international level, thus heightening nationalist feelings and encouraging the further development and manufacture of weapons (the rivalry between India and Pakistan being a case in point). This scenario, too, was prophesied decades earlier, along with the following admonishment: "The circle is complete and promises a grim future for mankind, unless irrational fears and apathy can be replaced by constructive, reasoning action in response to fears that are all too well-grounded in the facts.

Yet it's not just a question of addressing issues related to ethnic nationalism. Economic nationalism also plays a part, compounding an already complex and enigmatic situation. As one observer noted, "the social and political impact of economic restructuring in Yugoslavia has been carefully erased from our collective understanding. Opinion-makers instead dogmatically present cultural, ethnic, and religious divisions as the sole cause of the crisis. In reality, they are the consequence of a much deeper process of economic and political fracturing."

This is further compounded by the economic and political interests of third-party belligerents (i.e., NATO). It's no secret that along with the humanitarian rhetoric there are ulterior, strategic motives involved. As NATO Secretary General Javier Solana had warned previously during the NATO bombings in Bosnia, "the experience gained in Bosnia can be used in NATO future operations."

Taking this into consideration, some have concluded that the G-8 countries have profited immensely from the war -- at the expense of both Albanians and Serbs, not to mention neighbouring countries (which also include NATO allies). The testing of new weapons and delivery systems without doubt has given a boost to the US defence industry and its numerous subcontractors, namely Raytheon (who produces cruise missiles) and Boeing. Even Russia seems to have benefited in some way, by not only having a preview of how well (or badly) NATO armaments work, but also by obtaining samples of such high technology (such as a stealth fighter shot down over Yugoslavia).

While most aspects of the war in Yugoslavia have been examined in light of a post-Cold War framework -- everything from the use of buzz words like "ethnic cleansing" to musing over the technological wizardry of NATO armaments and the concept of Internet war -- little has been said about the historical comparisons which exist. These comparisons not only reveal a certain pattern that can be used to foresee an outcome, but also to help understand the underlying premises driving certain actions.

A prime example of this was the "accidental" bombing of the Chinese Embassy due to an error brought about by the use of an old map. It's incredible that the US government didn't have at its disposal the latest information, this despite all the new and sophisticated information gathering surveillance technology around. The Chinese Embassy tragedy, like so many others, had its precursor: during World War II, the Dieppe invasion, a tragedy in where Canadian soldiers were basically put ashore in Nazi dominated Europe as lambs to the slaughter, was also due to poor planning. The rocky terrain around Dieppe came as a surprise to those taking part in the invasion, who expected it to be sandy. It was later revealed that the invasion plans were based on an old postcard which showed a sandy beach, and thus preparations had been made accordingly.

The incident involving the Chinese embassy raises a serious question as to the competence of those who wage war. As one person noted on the Nettime mailing list, the "old" maps story provided a "good excuse" for incompetence:

In addition to poor planning, the reliance upon new and invulnerable weapons was another feature of the Yugoslavian conflict. Along these lines, the inadequacy of American hi-tech military also has its historical precedents. For instance, the shooting down of a stealth fighter during the war bears much resemblance to the downing of an American U2 spy plane in the 1960s, an aircraft which then similarly boasted of Titanic-like invincibility.

While the conduct of the war bears much resemblance to conflicts of the past, so too do the ideas upon which it was based. The idea of strategic bombing, like so many other military theories which attempt to put a humane face on acts of violence and aggression, parallels the mentality used by Allied military leaders during World War II when they conceived the concept of "morale bombing". The reasoning behind such bombing is that the main target of an attack should be the "morale" of a given population, the theory being that, once morale waned, the regime would crumble or the people would overthrow its leaders.

This concept has been repeatedly shown to been faulty. Official US studies after the Second World War concluded that the destruction wrought on the civilian population of Germany had no effect on the German war effort and, if anything, stiffened German morale. Likewise, during the Korean War, which was the last time US commanders deliberately bombed whole cities (and then just briefly), although the results have never been fully known, it still did not prevent the North from waging war. And in Iraq, studies also revealed that bombing Baghdad had little effect on that war. Indeed, no matter how much the Allies attempted to not only bomb but starve Saddam Hussein from power, he still remains in charge -- while those leaders who have originally fought against him have long since disappeared from the political scene.

Not surprisingly, western-based media ignored such historical comparisons. Instead, in order to find some point of reference, simplistic comparisons were made between Milosevic and Hitler. While some of these comparisons may be valid in many respects, what is conveniently avoided is a like comparison as to how these two men got as far as they had. By delving a little deeper, we see how the ignominious and morally bankrupt policies of the west have similarly been repeated.

As with Nazi Germany, the road to war was unobstructed. In both cases, the respective leaders were both seen as individuals with whom business could be done (indeed, in the case of Milosevic, he was seen as a "peace broker" at one stage). If Milosevic had been stopped at the beginning as with Hitler (the Munich Conference and Dayton Peace Accords are terrifyingly similar) then perhaps the problem could have been solved with far less bloodshed.

The question now remains whether this inability to prevent the conflict beforehand was due to sheer ignorance or callousness. In the case of the former, it's very frightening to think that weapons of mass destruction are in the hands of such ignoramuses. As for the latter, it's equally frightening to think that the entire conflict had become an opportunity for NATO to further test its hi-tech toys; having already run such field tests in a desert environment (i.e., Iraq), the time had been ripe for mountainous terrain (as in Yugoslavia). If such is indeed the case, what remains to be seen is whether this will be enough, or will more test sites eventually be needed (e.g., oceanic, arctic, etc...).[6]

As the Norwegian Helsinki Committee response to the Belgrade NGO appeal amply demonstrates, even those who are usually critical of western (namely US) policy seemed to have swallowed the NATO line, failing to look beyond the rhetoric and critically analyse what is going on. Not only was there an uncritical acceptance of NATO's stated aim, but many even commended NATO on being careful "to minimize civilian casualties". What had not been realised is that good intentions and actual policy don't always go hand in hand. Moreover, it lends an excuse for bad decisions and "mistakes" caused by negligence (or even spite) to which NATO's propaganda machine was able to respond that it was unintended -in other words, "collateral" damage.

The New World Order: Contradictions and Hypocrisy

In the media campaign to support the war, various phrases had been thrown around in order to incite deep emotion. In the words of Jerome Frank, "once we have cast another group in the role of the enemy, we know that they are to be distrusted -- that they are evil incarnate. We then twist all their communications to fit our own belief."

This technique was prevalent in the 1980s during the US support for the contras when the dichotomy between "terrorists" and "freedom fighters" was frequently used. Since then, the art of using language to either hide or put a more euphemistic face on situations has been perfected. Even among those who are in opposition to prevalent dogma, there appears to be a need to tone down the rhetoric.

Hence, the Mexican government's repression in Chiapas is frequently referred to as "low-intensity" warfare, when in fact it's not that far removed from the "ethnic cleansing" policies of the Serbian government. In this way many people are able to avoid glaring double standards and not consider themselves hypocrites by supporting NATO strikes in Yugoslavia while at the same time pursue a non-interventionist stance toward Mexico.

For some, however, this double standard is all too obvious: "If we're prepared to punish Milosevic for his treatment of the ethnic Albanians in Kosovo then presumably we should also be prepared to mount air attacks against Ankara for the Turks' treatment of their Kurdish minority, and the same applies to Beijing for the brutal Chinese suppression of the Tibetans. And then there's Indonesia and the treatment of East Timor. The list goes on and on."

This was a common sentiment among those who realised the hypocrisy of the situation. Yet, ironically, the hypocrisy behind the actions of NATO also extended in the other direction, frustrating those who felt that a ground invasion and forcible capture of Milosevic (and other war criminals) were in order. As far as the official position of those participating in the air campaign were concerned, NATO was not at war with Yugoslavia. Yet if ground troops were sent in, the tenacious facade of a humanitarian action and not being at war (which sounds better) could not be maintained no matter how hard media spin doctors tried.

The underlying message of all this, is quite clear: as far as the US and NATO is concerned, it is legally permissible to bomb another country from a distance, and if the bombed country dared to hit back with military force beyond their own borders then they can be considered the aggressors. Whether it was hoped to provoke Yugoslavia to take such extreme measures will perhaps never be known. Yet the fact that the US had planned for a ground assault from Hungary raises the question as to how much western countries were willing to gamble the relative stability of Central Europe, risking the possibility of the war spreading to neighbouring countries.[7]

One way in which the security of Central Europe had already been compromised anyway was in terms of the environment. The use of radioactive weapons has had a still to be determined negative effect on not only Yugoslavia but neighbouring countries as well. Hungary, for instance, recorded a marked increase in radiation levels around the south of the country, something which has been attributed to the conflict. Elsewhere, as in the Hortobágyi region (the central part of the country, well removed from the border area), over 50 tonnes of kerosene was accidentally dumped by a NATO fuel aircraft.

Naturally, what neighbouring countries had suffered is nothing compared to Yugoslavia. And it is here where the hypocrisy of the whole situation is stark, as one person noted on the paradox of an environmentalist supporting the return of refugees to a radioactive wasteland: "I don't know whether to cry or to laugh when I listen to the German foreign minister, Mr. Joschka Fischer, representative of the Green party, who strongly supports the return of refugees to a radioactively contaminated and completely ruined Kosovo."

For some who supported action against Yugoslavia, only to be later disillusioned by the whole affair, the hypocrisy was not in the objectives of the NATO action, but the means by which these objectives were to be achieved. "Can countries, that rely on image of [being] civilized and democratic, involve themselves in something so decidedly barbaric?" asked Ivo Skoric, a Yugoslavian exile who writes frequently about the Balkans. Commenting about the use of graphite bombs to blackout large areas of Yugoslavia, Skoric notes that such tactics were used in the siege of Sarajevo years earlier by the Serbs and subsequently condemned by the international community. "Can we behave like Serbs, yet pretend we are something better?" he asks bluntly.

Similar indecencies occurred throughout the war, for instance when cluster bombs were used against Yugoslavia (this, despite the fact that the use of cluster bombs are internationally banned). The irony of all this wasn't lost on Skoric: "As the war goes on, there is more collateral damage showing up, and there is more public willingness to accept it without an outrage: the US police philosophy that in queasy situations it is OK to use overwhelming firepower first and then ask questions became widely accepted code of conduct of [the] international community vs. Serbia."

For those totally opposed to the NATO bombardment, a crucial element to their argument was the question of sovereignty. Although a difficult issue to overcome, justification for the bombing of Yugoslavia was nonetheless based on the premise that there are limits to sovereignty, as the following post explains: "the incessant yammering about sovereignty is gibberish from my perspective. I believe that a country that treats [the] UN declaration of human rights, Geneva convention and similar charters with sarcastic disdain, should be stripped of its sovereignty the same way like a Congressman who kills is stripped of his immunity. Protection of international law applies to those who uphold the international law."

Ironically, when it comes to international law, the US is one of the world's biggest hypocrites. As Noam Chomsky pointed out, there is a regime of international law and international order, binding on all states, based on the UN Charter and subsequent resolutions and World Court decisions. In brief, the threat or use of force is banned unless explicitly authorised by the Security Council after it has determined that peaceful means have failed, or in self-defence against "armed attack" (a narrow concept) until the Security Council acts.

The fact that NATO had launched their strikes without authorisation of the Security Council nor even a declaration of war, shows that they themselves are not law-abiding nations (a euphemism for the word "criminal"). As Chomsky eloquently put it, "despite the desperate efforts of ideologues to prove that circles are square, there is no serious doubt that the NATO bombings further undermine what remains of the fragile structure of international law."

In conjunction with this is the smug attitude on the part of NATO that the alliance is not under the auspices of any legal body and thus needed no permission. Indeed, as Jane Perlez, writing in the New York Times a month before the start of hostilities, noted, the US refused to permit the "neuralgic word `authorize'" to appear in the final NATO statement, unwilling to concede any authority to the UN Charter and international law; only the word "endorse" was permitted.

"I have to say I'm really disturbed to see Canada and the rest of the NATO member nations committing an act of war without the backing and foundation of an authorizing resolution from the United Nations Security Council," wrote one individual. "Frankly, it sets a very dangerous precedent, and it bothers me a lot."

Selective Attention

As already mentioned, part of the hypocrisy on the part of NATO has to do with the fact that what has been happening in Kosovo is not unique but a world-wide enigma. Indeed, in some cases it has gone on for decades without a whimper from the international community.[8] This was made worse during the war with Yugoslavia. With coverage of the bombing dominating the shrinking newshole in the United States for international news, important stories such as massacres in East Timor didn't get the amount of coverage they should have had.[9]

One reason for this is because military repression and ethnic cleansing in other areas of the world have been supported in large part by the US government. Noam Chomsky gave a brief, but very damming report, of some of these areas of conflict. In Colombia, for instance, according to US State Department estimates, the annual level of political killing by the government and its paramilitary associates is about at the level of Kosovo, and refugee flight primarily from these atrocities is well over a million. Colombia, meanwhile, has been the Western hemisphere's leading recipient of US arms and training as violence increased through the 1990s. This assistance is now increasing under a "drug war" pretext, a vain excuse dismissed by almost all serious observers.[10]

Elsewhere, the US government still supports one of the most blatant examples of repression against an ethnic minority: that of the Kurds in Turkey. As Chomsky notes, by very conservative estimates Turkish repression of Kurds in the 1990s also falls in the category of Kosovo. A Le Monde Diplomatique article put the irony more succinctly: how can the European Union turn a blind eye to Kurdish demands while they defend the Kosovars' right to autonomy in the Balkans?[11]

The Kurdish conflict has been a long and bloody one, and not only involves Turkey but several neighbouring countries as well. According to Chomsky, it peaked in the early 1990s; one index is the flight of over a million Kurds from the countryside to the unofficial Kurdish capital Diyarbakir from 1990 to 1994, as the Turkish army was devastating the countryside. The year 1994 marked two records: it was "the year of the worst repression in the Kurdish provinces" of Turkey (Jonathan Randal reported from the scene) and the year when Turkey became "the biggest single importer of American military hardware and thus the world's largest arms purchaser." When human rights groups exposed Turkey's use of US jets to bomb villages, the Clinton Administration found ways to evade laws requiring suspension of arms deliveries, much as it was doing in Indonesia and elsewhere.

While some observers have noted the parallels between the conflicts in Yugoslavia and Turkey, little mention has been made of the others. In fact, Israel/PLO and Mexico/EZLN have been scarcely mentioned by either side of the debate, as if these conflicts suddenly no longer existed or were no longer important enough to worry about. Moreover, one person raised a valid, and very disturbing point: "the loss of life in Kosovo is really low. And remember that of those 2,000, probably 25 per cent were Serbs -- they lose that many people in a day in southern Sudan. The death count -- tragic as it is -- really isn't that high." Jeremy Salt, writing in Arena Journal before the Kosovo crisis erupted into war, goes further, quantifying something that otherwise shouldn't be quantified: "around the world these are very dangerous times and there is no shortage of a human suffering on a scale far worse than the Palestinians have been experiencing, if such things can be measured."[12]

What is perhaps most shocking in this selective attention toward world crises is that of the plight of refugees. As the LA Times in late May, 1999, revealed, there were stark and enormous difference in the way Kosovo refugees were provided for and those elsewhere.[13] According to the report, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees spent in the Balkans up to more than 11 times what it spends in Africa (about 11 cents a day per refugee in Africa; in the Balkans, the figure was $1.23).[14]

The disproportionate level of care was significant. For Kosovo refugees, camps had as many as one doctor per 700 refugees (a ratio far better than that of many communities in Los Angeles), readily available clean water, and ready-made meals. In Africa, on the other hand, refugee camps have one doctor for every 100,000, water is scarce (e.g., in Eriteria a family of ten is given 3.5 gallons -- about 16 litres -- of water that is supposed to last 3 days), and refugees are usually given only basic grains such as sorghum or wheat.

In addition to differences in basic necessities, the camps in the Balkans also had mobile phones that refugees were able to use. There also were soccer fields, basketball courts and ping-pong tables. One camp even had a children's center with two theatres showing films like "The Never Ending Story." In the case of Stankovac, which was the third-largest camp in the Balkans, Marion Droz, a Red Cross field worker who also worked during the Rwandan crisis earlier this decade, commented that "compared to the refugee camps in Africa, Stankovac is a five-star hotel."

The LA times report offered many explanations for these differences, most of them revolving around a complex mix of logistics, culture and race. The most common explanation offered for the gap in resources was culture and the differences between the backgrounds of the refugees on the two continents. In Africa, for example, where life is far more simple and many refugees live in semi-nomadic tribes, the bare provisions of shelter and health care offered by the refugee camps are actually a step up in life for many. In Europe, on the other hand, where many of the refugees from Kosovo had two cars, a city apartment and their own business, a night in a canvas tent with cold food is misery. Thus, the differences are relative; what is important is that you have to maintain people's dignity.

This explanation is purely ridiculous. Even the report failed to question the most obvious fallacy in this argument: that is, the vast majority of Kosovo refugees don't have two cars, a city apartment and their own business. Kosovo is one of the poorest areas of Yugoslavia, and one with the highest rate of unemployment. With the possible exception of Albania, it's the poorest region in the Balkans, no less Central and Eastern Europe. Not only that, but shelter, food, and water should be the same everywhere.

Aside from the "culture gap" hypothesis, other explanations for the gap in aid appeared more sensible. Yugoslavia is in Europe's backyard; hence, the crisis seemed more immediate and tangible. What is more, wealthy donors in the developed world feel more sympathy -- and reach deeper into their pockets -- for those with similar skin tones and backgrounds. The media, as a result, played a significant role in determining the conditions for refugees. In Macedonia alone, there were more than 1,000 reporters. As one food worker said during the crisis, "you can't walk in the camps here for tripping over the television cables."

Something New Turned into Something Old

Despite the historical comparisons, contradictions, and hypocrisy that abound, it's still commonly believed that computer mediated communications (i.e., the Internet) has somehow changed the character of war, and that this will be increasingly true as such resources become more widely used.

For most, the fact that the Internet survived the war (both in Yugoslavia and abroad) is somehow proof of its inviolability. With information independently flowing in, out, and around the theatre of war, the medium has proven itself to be a subversive and uncontrollable power. Even within the framework of modern warfare -- in where the media plays a crucial role -- the Internet had absolved itself. As was frequently pointed out, "if the first task of modern war is to take control of the media, the arena in which battles are increasingly fought, then the Net makes it a trickier proposition."

Hence, as Jay Moore pointed out in his article "Activists Online"[15], the Internet made it possible to get news directly from the source, thereby making possible more informed evaluations of whether the mainstream media are being truthful. Furthermore, anti-war voices, including notable ones such as Noam Chomsky, which were rarely featured on the mainstream media, were nonetheless able to expose the distortions and hypocrisy of NATO policy on various web-based forums, such as mailing lists (e.g., Nettime) and webzines (e.g., Z Magazine).

Subsequently, there seems to be no means for controlling the medium, which has thwarted leaders who had succeeded in repressing all sorts of free expression for decades. This, despite the fact that most governments are in unison for imposing some sort of regulation in order to "protect" the young generation from the dangers of pornography and, more recently, guerrilla politics via the Internet.

Yet the reason why the Internet is not clamped down against is not because it's so elusive. As the ice storm in Quebec in 1998 proved, cutting off electricity for an extended period of time will cut off the vast majority of users, even mobile users unless they have a generator. Thus, if a dictator really wants, they can cut off and control news coming through the Internet. However, with the promise of economic opportunity associated with Internet development, even dictators are ready to embrace the new media to a limited extent.

This is because even the most notorious of political leaders are somewhat pragmatic, and realise the cost for trying to control information on the Internet is in no way proportionate to the returns. Thus, an oppressive system is not going to overly worry about the "little guys" and will tolerate a certain amount of leakage. In the case of Yugoslavia, since the vast majority don't have Internet access -- indeed, have never used the Internet and/or have only vague notions about it -- there is no threat that uncensored information will reach the general public.

Not only this, it's a lot easier to infiltrate the Internet and try to confuse and complicate the issues in order to ensure that the truth remains buried, so that people spend more time arguing among themselves rather than seek out a solution. This, in turn, leaves many disillusioned, cynical, apathetic and, in some cases, maybe even wins back some support for the regime.

A good example of the truth being mangled beyond all recognition was the World Court ruling in the case brought by Yugoslavia against the NATO countries to stop the bombing. Western media (as well as media from newly established NATO members in Central Europe, such as Hungary) put an immediate pro-war spin on the news, saying that Yugoslavia lost the case. Actually, the court had only turned down Yugoslavia's request for provisional measures to halt the bombings, pending hearings on its legality in international law. The hearings would still go ahead, and the court said it was "profoundly concerned with the use of force in Yugoslavia" which, "under the present circumstances [...] raises very serious issues of international law."[16]

Thus, the question remains as to whether communications technologies like the Internet won't simply evolve into asymmetric channels for disseminating propaganda, one that indubitably serves the interests of a ruling elite. The fact that during the war in Yugoslavia the Internet was flooded with propaganda of all sorts, attests to the fact that it's not an altruistic source of information.

What is more, there is absolutely nothing stopping governments from using the Internet -- as with all forms of media -- to their own advantage during a conflict. "The yet unseen pictures from inside Kosovo will merely intensify the war," wrote Geert Lovink on Nettime. "Even without shocking imagery we are faced with an evidence overload. There is no truth in the unseen. We are reaching here the point of equation: media=war."

Moreover, when the threat of actually cutting off Internet access to Yugoslavia became apparent (whether this was actually viable or not), the assumed inviolability of the medium was temporarily shaken. Slobodan Markovic, a young computer programmer who reported almost daily to the Syndicate and Nettime mailing lists from Belgrade, puts the effort to shut down the Internet in Yugoslavia in a broader perspective: "This attempt of shutting down Internet satellite feeds to Yugoslavia is a good reminder that Cyberspace is not situated in some kind of a vacuum and that our REAL governments CAN and WILL do anything that suits their interests. Just like corporate invertebrates, they will do all of that regardless of our communication customs and ethics we developed over years on the Net." Somehow, the physical dimension of the Internet is lost on most people, leading many to regard the Internet as indestructible. Not only are references about the Internet able to survive a nuclear war often quoted, but net pundits have also spawned the notion of the "death of distance", in where physical constraints are somehow overcome and, in many cases, no longer of any consequence.

To this extent, the Internet has become a cult association for many; it's a religion of sorts, where faith and belief in a paradise to come (i.e., after the revolution) is its main driving force. As John Hinkson explains, "a straightforward reference to 'technology' ultimately acts as an ideology for it gives no focus to the very processes which will ultimately suggest the objects of a new politics."[17]

The perceived power of the medium often defines our subsequent understanding of world events. It's commonly believed that if there is any important information not carried by the mainstream media, then it can be found on the Internet. Conversely, if something can't be found on the Internet, then it doesn't exist.

This, however, is clearly not the case. Most of the time when exclusive information is culled from the Internet, reference to it comes from traditional and mainstream media sources (the Clinton-Lewinsky scandal being a case in point). Likewise, information on the Internet is imprisoned by the very constraints that pundits claim the medium does away with -- namely, geographic, cultural, and linguistic differences.

This was exemplified on the Nettime list during the war, when Ivo Skoric posted the following: "Where is that Yugoslav Army officer that KLA captured and delivered to Americans in Tirana? We never saw him? Isn't it strange that the free media did not yet get his face?" The natural result of this among some users was a reinforced mistrust of mainstream media (which had originally carried the news) and the formulation of conspiracy theories to explain the missing information (i.e., follow-up news of the captured Yugoslav Army officer).

Yet, contrary to Skoric's doubts, the Hungarian mainstream media (such as MTV, which stands for Magyar Televízíó and not music tv) actually covered the story of the POW being handed over to Yugoslav authorities. The officer was handed over from Hungary toward the end of the war, with the local media showing live footage of the hand-over.

This episode betrays the subtle influence of an American dominated view of the world that most net users possess. That is, CNN and western media outlets (not just the US but the UK and Germany as well) are the news, and what they don't cover probably never happened. Moreover, most people are under the assumption that information flows freely when not directly censored by the state or corporate interests which, in the case of the Yugoslav POW, is not always the case.

Thus, despite talk about a "global village" brought about by computer mediated communications technology, although the boundaries of isolation caused by distance, time, language, and culture have been somewhat lowered, they nevertheless still exist.

Still, in spite of all this, the assumption of the inviolability of the medium, along with its seemingly "revolutionary" potential, lingers. In order to properly put the role and influence of the Internet into proper perspective, we have to look at how the Internet has influenced world events prior to the war in Yugoslavia.

Internet Revolution

Since the beginning, when the Internet had begun to be popularised in the early to mid nineties, there has been talk of its "revolutionary" potential. In terms of media, the promise of the Internet is based on the supposed control available to the individual to modulate information. With traditional mass media, for example, a small group of editors decided which news were fit to print. Now, with a host of on-line services at their fingertips, average users are able to "edit their own newspaper", or what Nicholas Negroponte is fond of calling The Daily Me.[18] Furthermore, Internet technologies provide individuals with unprecedented publishing power and access to the most heterogeneous information sources.

Yet it doesn't just stop there. The Internet is expected to revolutionise (or has already revolutionised, according to some) all aspects of our lives: from the way we work and learn to the way we socialise. Even now, people are still talking of the "Internet Revolution", while some observers have noted that this revolution is already running out of steam.[19]

Part of this revolution also includes social and political discourse. Ironically, the first instance when the Internet was said to have had a revolutionary impact on world affairs was during the student demonstrations in Belgrade in 1996. Then, a commentator wrote these memorial lines:

"Even revolutions aren't what they used to be, since there is internet. The times of illegal printing-presses in wet cellars, seditious pamphlets spread by revolutionaries in duffle coats, are over."[20]

In retrospect, we can see how premature this declaration really was. If the Belgrade demonstrations were supposed to be a revolution driven by the Internet, then whatever happened to this revolution? As we have seen, the Internet didn't help Yugoslavia avoid the road to war.

Nevertheless, this did not deter pundits looking for a way to validate the revolutionary impact of the Internet. Soon enough, another revolution was on its way: Indonesia and the fall of Suharto. "In Indonesia," wrote one observer, "[the Internet] has even managed to help topple a strongman who, until his unscheduled resignation in May 1998, had been Asia's longest reigning post-war ruler." According to revolutionary pundits, the downfall of Suharto is attributed to the fact that Indonesian authorities, like their counterparts in other countries, simply could not have imagined that an ordinary computer would be too powerful for them to control.

Contrary to what some may think, alternative politics over the Internet had been going on in Indonesia for some time. Much of this has been in the form of hacking an opponent's site.[21] For instance, the homepage of the BPPT office, which had been singing praises of the technological developments under then Minister of Research and Technology, B.J. Habibie, was penetrated by Portuguese hackers in late November of 1996. The attack, it was said, had been made to mark the fifth anniversary of the Sta. Cruz massacre of unarmed pro-independence demonstrators shot dead by Indonesian soldiers. Such hacker attacks were repeated on various official Indonesian government sites, including the home pages of the armed forces, the police, the Ministry of Defence and Security, as well as the ruling party Golkar. In retaliation, pro-Indonesian government hackers attacked websites in Portugal.

Yet despite such alternative political activity that went on behind the scenes over the Internet, the influence of the medium in the removal of Suharto was minimal. Instead, his removal from office followed a more, traditional pattern.

Frequently, when it comes to power struggles, popular discontent is used as a means to remove a head of state or leader of a party. This is almost universally practised: so went the coup against Margaret Thatcher in the UK; with Ceausescu in Romania, it was a little more violent. There is every reason to believe that Suharto suffered a similar type of no-confidence vote. Considering that B.J. Habibie was Minister of Research and Technology under the former regime, and thus the one who was the most Internet savvy among the Suharto's former cronies, it should come as no surprise that network communications were subsequently used as an auxiliary weapon in the removal of Suharto from power. Nor should it come as a surprise that it was Habibie who then took over the reigns of power.

But the so-called "Indonesian revolution", a hybrid of both the Romanian revolution and the Belgrade street protests, in the end changed nothing. True, the one on the very top changed, but the corruption remained. Not only this, but Suharto was able to make a graceful exist, taking his billions along with him.

If the Internet was so instrumental in bringing about "change" to Indonesia, as so many claim, then Habibie himself would not have been able to obtain power. The most damning material to be found on the Internet at the time of Suharto's downfall was a list of assets of government leaders, compiled by Dr. George Junus Aditjondro. Not only did this list contain the assets of Suharto's families and their cronies, but of Habibie's as well. Moreover, that fact that the foreign minister under Suharto was retained under Habibie shows that the revolution in Indonesia was, for all intents and purposes, cosmetic.

Thus, although Suharto is no longer in power, Indonesia remains restless and is still in the grip of recession. Despite the first free multi-party general elections in 44 years, the hoped-for peaceful transition has not been forthcoming. The archipelago is still racked by bloody confrontations between ethnic and religious communities or political factions.

Internet War

In spite of the fact that the role of the Internet was minimal in bringing about revolution and significant social change, as exemplified in both Belgrade and Indonesia, the war in Yugoslavia was regarded as the ultimate test -- its baptism of fire, so to speak.

Although many characterise the war in Yugoslavia to be the first "Internet war", the fact is the Internet was already used in a like conflict as a means for communication. During the latter stages of the civil war in Bosnia, for instance, when Bihac was reported to be cut off from the world and looked like it would become the next UN "safe haven" to fall, there was real-time contact via e-mail and satellite phone links with someone sheltering in a basement in Bihac -- sending out instant messages as Serb artillery shells exploded nearby.

For most, when analysing the notion of the first "Internet War", the actual outcome of the conflict doesn't seem to really matter. Many are of the opinion that "peace itself probably doesn't make a difference either way"; what is important, though, is that the Internet has "certainly changed our perceptions of how wars are fought". As Steve Carlson, moderator of the Online Europe mailing list, elaborated, "it's one thing to watch a video of a cruise missile destroying a Belgrade military HQ, and quite another to read the email diaries of a 19-year old kid living across the street from that building."

In addition to this, the way in which the Internet was directly applied in the actual conflict, as in the case of the web used as an early warning device[22], was considered to be a novel development. Such novel uses of the medium, however, appeared to be more of a media distraction than the serious implementation of the Internet for waging war. As Andras Riedlmayer noted on Nettime, a web-based early warning system is a phenomenon worth recording, but whether they're of any real use to the Yugoslav military (which most probably has a more sophisticated early warning devices) is open to debate.

In spite of this, what actually made the war in Yugoslavia important from the perspective of the Internet was not the images it provided or the novel ways in which the medium was used. Instead, as the conflict raged, a parallel war was being fought to sway public opinion. "It was a guerrilla war," writes Steven Carlson of the Online Europe mailing list, "waged by thousands of private citizens on both sides of the conflict expressing their opinions on bulletin boards, websites, and in widely-circulated email dairies." Despite the accuracy or hidden biases which were to be found in these materials, Carlson believes that this role of the Internet in the Balkan conflict has added to its credibility as a medium. "This is a special mechanism," writes another observer, "to post real life informational e-mail updates from the Kosovo/Serbia/Yugoslavia region to the web for the world to see."

For most users, this was the importance of the Internet as a medium during the war: it brought us closer to the action. It seems, in the developed world at least, lives have become so dull that new frills and chills are continuously needed, as in the case of the web as an early warning device: "This is the best minute-to-minute, early-warning and strikes-review Web site for ordinary citizens in Yugoslavia, right now," exclaimed one enthusiast. "FAR better and faster than TV and most radio stations (in Yugoslavia AND abroad)."

Although a lot of energy and excitement was generated over the Internet, the "guerrilla war" which paralleled the actual conflict, far from establishing some sort of credibility for the medium, merely reinforced the mythology surrounding the revolutionary aspect of the Internet -and that of Internet War in particular. Geert Lovink explains: "With Serbian 'dissident' media being shut down, journalists being killed and intimidated, and Kosovo being destroyed and emptied of people, who is there to do the 'authentic' Internet reporting? It is therefore strange, saying that the Gulfwar belonged to CNN, with Kosovo now being the first Internet war. At least, the pop mythology likes to see it that way."

In essence, Internet coverage of the war quickly degraded into a media circus of arm-chair historians, pseudo foreign policy experts, self-appointed military gurus, and virtual diplomats. People followed the war in Yugoslavia as if was some sort of soap opera. "We need more information" was the common view of those scouring the Internet. In actual fact, we don't. The Kosovo crisis is not a sudden crisis; it has been going on for years, and most astute observers warned by the fall of last year that unless western governments work out a proper formula, fighting will resume and that there will be a massive humanitarian crisis. All this was already known well beforehand. We also already know of the horrors of ethnic cleansing and NATO bombing, as demonstrated in Bosnia and Iraq respectively. Thus, more time and energy should not be on gathering more information, but on working out a political solution to the conflict. Unfortunately, however, most were obsessed with writing down (and reading) history as it happens -- as if by which to somehow secure their place in it.

In a way, this reflects the true poverty of the digital age (not to mention the post Cold War era's concept of the "death of history"). The past is somehow meaningless and incomprehensible. Notions of "left", "right", "nationalism", "internationalism" have become obsolete and thrown on the trash heap of history (witness the emergence of the New Center in Germany, New Labour in the UK, and, of course, the New Left in the US). History itself has been relegated to the background in favour of a technologically-laden futurism.

This lies at the heart of the moral morass we are presently witnessing. Because the concept of nationalism has been simply sidelined and not constructively dealt with, what has been going on in the Balkans is inconceivable for those outside the region. At the same time, we see ourselves perpetually on the threshold of something, something "historic" (in spite of the fact that history is considered to be boring, useless, and meaningless). Subsequently, we have become more concerned with writing and experiencing history as it happens instead of possibly changing its course. Meanwhile, the slaughter and suffering continues outside the warm confines of our armchairs.

It should come as no surprise, then, that the so-called Internet War had degraded early on into a form of interactive prime time entertainment. What is more, the war in Yugoslavia had shown how the Internet is, in many ways, merely an extension of traditional mass media. This even applies to more alternative or "independent" media sources (such as Nettime), for they also seemed to follow the priorities set by traditional mass media which, in turn, direct public attention into the mould of "present" topics. As one person put it bluntly: "I've seen both sides use the medium to spread their -biased- views on current events. I've seen lots of media manipulation, on- and off-line. In this regard, the Internet isn't that different from other media. The only difference is that the information seems to have more of a personal touch to it."

Disillusionment and Net Fatigue

Among the novelties which resulted from Internet coverage of the war, was the emergence of a new form of discourse, the so-called "-gram" postings (as evidenced on Nettime with the "ivogram" and "geertogram"). Although digest forms from mailing lists are common, the fact that individuals regarded themselves as information centers was, nevertheless, a unique development. In a way, this fulfilled Negroponte's notion of The Daily Me, except that instead of being strictly for individual consumption, it was spread outward.

The only problem with this is that it added to an information glut, in which the Internet increasingly featured more information, but not necessarily better information. A prominent feature of the discourse that went on during the war was frequent repetition. This not only included the same message from different users following in close succession, but also, as with Nettime's posting of Chomsky's piece "The Current Bombings", the repetitions were spread out in time. And, of course, there are the frequent cut and paste posts which, if they were to reduce themselves to original content, would leave scarcely one or two sentences of anything original.

To this extent, it could be seen how the Internet could be used as a new tool for manipulation. The Internet accommodates a wide range of views, from radical to moderate, pro-democracy activists to intelligence officers masquerading as anti-establishment rebels. With such a mixed bag, the truth often becomes mangled, with one side supporting their version of events. Indeed, there is every reason to believe that intelligence officers from both sides of the conflict participated in the myriad dialogues which took place, with the aim to counter any negative information through the use of both polite and coarse language. As a result, you could never be sure who was saying what, and for what reason, as Carlson explains:

"In most cases I'm wading through an anonymous barrage of words, often cut off from any other context than the fears and anxieties of the authors. Isn't this just electronic voyeurism? There's some emotionally powerful writing out there, but can any of this be verified? I've also heard that some of these reports may actually be written by Serbian government propagandists."

Along these lines, some had remarked that the Serbs had prepared themselves well for an "info-war" and that NATO, in this respect, was caught with their collective their pants down. In retrospect, however, we can see how this was not the case, that the ground was already prepared for NATO's hi-tech war. For instance, three weeks prior to when the bombs started dropping, reports circulated throughout the Internet about hackers taking control of a British satellite. A couple of days later, a top Pentagon official warned Congress about "the very real threat of cyberterrorists".

As Felix Stadler later pointed out in a post to Nettime (March 2, 1999), which was in response to the story of the hacked military satellite, the fact that an unconfirmed report was picked up by a respected wire service (Reuters), and then spread by an equally respected news service on the Internet (Yahoo!), was enough to convince people that what was reported was true, despite the fact that no independent confirmation for the source of information existed. As Stadler concluded, "it's a good example of how news travel in a network environment, of how new and old media, the public and the private are interrelated and of the self-perpetuating nature of rumours."

Although most people on the Internet eventually realised that the hacker story was a hoax, the stage was nevertheless set. In Hungary, the myth of the hacked satellite was conveniently used by the mainstream news media in their reports about the "info-war" aspect of the NATO attacks. This coincided with similar reports in other countries which ran on the exact same day (April 2, 1999). In its re-hashed form, a Hungarian "expert" explained the dynamics of this "new" type of warfare, redefining info-war so as to exclude the term propaganda.

Likewise, in almost every language the savvy term "info-war" was used which meant anything from "smart" bombs and guided cruise missiles, to the way in which information about the war is presented by the media, including the new media. This, in turn, conveniently replaced the specific term "propaganda". The reason for this is the term "propaganda" automatically carries with it negative connotations whereas "info-war" sounds a lot better. Thus, we can talk about an "info-war" being waged on the Internet without having to worry about the implications of being merely a cog in a vast propaganda machine.

For more seasoned users of the Internet, this failure of the "Internet War" became apparent through the eventual break-down of net discourse and subsequent onslaught of net fatigue. This could be witnessed in the breakdown in moderation of several lists and sites, as the exact same messages were repeated over and over again. Within a week of the start of the war, online dialogue degraded into digital diarrhoea, drowning out the little bits of information that could be had. On Nettime, for instance, the moderator at one point added the following note: "this is where moderation gets really hard, because it involves conflicting interests -- and not just 'individual' interests. as [sic!] the belligerents in the war are beginning to learn, war has a way of reproducing itself. please [sic!] ask yourself whether you want to start causing or furthering war on this list too."

"Do we really have to be sent these paranoid rants by the apologists for Serbian fascism?" asked one arm-chair observer on Nettime. "The whole debate about the serbian situation on nettime is the most ludicrous thing on this list I've ever witnessed," added another. "Mostly everyone appears to be simply regurgitating the propaganda of whatever side they've happened to choose."

Nettime provides a good example of how the info-war evolved on the Internet, vacillating between enthusiasm, disillusionment, and self-appraisal. As the moderator for the list at one point noted, "after the first shock, it is time to rethink our position within the flow of information." He continued: "please do not misinterpret us. This is not a call to return to 'normality'."[23]

As for individuals who regularly posted to such lists, the fatigue was evident. "Milosevic might finally fall, but I wouldn't bet on it yet," wrote Ivo Skoric on Nettime, adding "I will, however, cease posting my daily comments now, since I am tired of this war, and it is now obvious which direction it will take" (needless to say, he resumed a short while later, albeit a little restrained). Others, like Steve Carlson from the Online Europe list, were more succinct: "I'm tired of all this, and I just wish it would end."

These are just two examples of how the impotence of the Internet affected people. Their being tired had not so much to do with physical weariness, but a feeling of insignificance associated with the inability to actually initiate some sort of change. John Hinkson, writing before the outbreak of the war, notes that this condition is, in a way, inherit within net culture, "that is, hi-tech society in its purest form is social -- it has form -- but it works by way of a mode of sociality which, like the internet, feeds off but does not predominantly work through relations which value the immediacy or presence of others."[24]

This runs counter to the professed revolutionary aspect of the Internet -- one that is supposed to transcend the complexities of social change and societal relationships. Hence, when put to the test (as in the case of war, when social relations which value the immediacy or presence of others is at their highest) net culture inexorably leads to an uncomfortable paradox which, consequently, manifests itself in disillusionment and net fatigue.

The fact that the war in Yugoslavia was not something clear and distinct and -- more importantly -- one that ran for a relatively long time[25], has thus shattered the illusion of the Internet as being some sort of revolutionary, social emancipator. Like the Vietnam war, which caused a lingering social trauma for Americans because the war was not a quick one and, in the end, was not even won, Internet enthusiasts are going through the same sort of crisis. Everything is supposed to be black and white and, above all, quick. When true social problems reveal themselves -- ones which cannot be solved overnight and ones in which there is a shared sense of guilt and truth interwoven among all parties concerned, physical and moral fatigue naturally ensues.

In addition to this, it must be kept in mind that a person can only take so much information and carry only so much responsibility. If a person tries to carry more than they are capable -- usually referred to by the term "information overload" -- then a person collapses; subsequently, in order to save themselves from collapse, they reject the responsibility that exceeds their capacity. In this way they can sleep at night and carry on processing huge amounts of information.

Hence, as the war dragged on, people began to tire of it and just wanted it to end. The final ignominy in all this is that the desire for a settlement was not because of the Albanians and Serbs who were suffering, but because the spectators themselves were suffering from having to deal with something they were either not prepared for or something they were unwilling to constructively deal with.

The Ultimate Failure

Despite more information and the perceived, pivotal role that the Internet was supposed to have, the ultimate failure of the medium is bluntly summed up by this one observation: "Could it be that a real war, with real pain and suffering, reveals just how incapable the Internet and, in particular, online conversations are of enacting real strategies for helping others?" Geert Lovink is even more sceptical: "The problem here, in my view," he writes, "is the not any longer existing [sic!] distinction between war and peace."

The digerati, naturally, continue to skirt around this uncomfortable, yet hard hitting, dose of reality. John Perry Barlow, true to form, replied in what can be only described as pure Barlowian gibberish (in other words, a classic example of people not knowing what they are talking about): "So, what did you expect at first, my fellow Internet Guru?" he writes. "This would be a bad time to lose faith over so little a matter as the inability of an entirely new place to conform to one's time-deep expectations his kind has only inhabited since they had memory."

For some, the most painful aspect of the role played by the Internet in the conflict is the failure of hacker culture. "The newly proclaimed infowar of hackers and secret services does not prevent any Kosovo villagers from being expelled," admits Lovink. "It just opens a next, still insignificant, battleground."

Contrary to a popular myth of the hacker as an anarchic, anti-establishment individual whose guiding philosophy is "information wants to be free", the war in Yugoslavia had divided hackers, as with everyone else, along socio-political (namely nationalist) lines. Consequently, hackers operating on behalf of one side (e.g. Slav brotherhood and anti-NATO groups versus pro-Albania and anti-Serb groups) fought a dislocated war, launching attacks to and from wherever they could (e.g., Russia, USA, Switzerland, China, etc.).

In the end, the role of the Internet in the NATO war on Yugoslavia highlights a gnawing paradox of the digital age, one which shall be carried over into the Third Millennium -- that of increased freedom of thought at the expense of freedom of action. Zygmut Bauman, writing in Arena Journal, summed it up in this way:

"Freedom of thought, expression, and association has reached unheard-of proportions and comes closer than ever before to being truly unbound. The paradox, however, is this unprecedented liberty comes at a time when there is little use to which it can be put, and little chance of reforging 'freedom from constraint' into 'liberty to act'."[26]

Conclusion

Apart from the fact that the NATO war against Yugoslavia was the first European conflict in half a century, the way in which computer mediated communications is supposed to have changed the way in which wars are now fought proved to be minimal. The concept that this was the first "Internet War" is misplaced and premature. If anything, this conflict merely demonstrated how something apparently new and "revolutionary" is turning (or has already turned) into something old and reactionary.

Subsequent net fatigue and disillusionment attest to the fact that, among seasoned users of the medium at least, the hype did not fulfil expectations. Indeed, even hacker culture itself proved to be not immune from the ideological (and nationalist) passions upon which the war was based. This, in turn, raises fears that computer mediated communication technologies like the Internet will slowly revert into asymmetric channels for the dissemination of sophisticated propaganda, to be called upon as the occasion requires.

Hence, what the NATO war against Yugoslavia confirms is that history is not dead, and that what is needed now more than ever is a more holistic approach to international affairs in conjunction with the application of computer mediated communications. Only with such an approach can the Internet be instrumental in furthering civic discourse and political change. To think otherwise, that simply using the medium is enough in itself to accomplish such a task, will only perpetuate those problems which for millennia past we have been unable to overcome.

http://www.heise.de/tp/artikel/5/5435/1.html