Georgia: A Velvet Revolution?
John Horvath 27.11.2003
Power to the people
The end of the Shevardnadze era in Georgian politics was both sudden and somewhat expected. After protesters stormed into parliament, breaking open the doors with their bare hands, pundits from abroad watching democracy in action through their television screens wondered whether this abrupt change would degrade into violence or not, and how much real change this revolution from the bottom would bring.
The answer to the first question was subsequently revealed: there was practically no violence, although some observers had made mention of the fisticuffs between Shevarnadze supporters and the opposition, despite the fact these few incidents are nothing compared to the hooliganism of British and German football matches.
As for whether what happened in Tiblisi over the weekend represents real change, we will have to wait and see. Yet to understand fully what happened in Georgia, we have to put everything into context of the political changes which had happened throughout Central and Eastern Europe in the late eighties and early nineties.
Broadly speaking, we can differentiate between four types of political change which took place over the years throughout the region: stillborn, reform, civil unrest, and revolution. These types cover a wide spectrum and often merge into one another. At both ends of the scale are examples of only one country choosing an extreme path: one the one side there is Belarus, which can be said to have had a stillborn process of change or, to put it another way, where little has changed at all; on the other is Romania, which was the only country which saw a violent overthrow of the old order, culminating in the execution of the Ceausescus.
Most other countries, however, ended up going down a path somewhere between the two. Naturally, this doesn't mean there was no violence outside of Romania. What happened in the former Yugoslavia, for instance, was perhaps the bloodiest of them all, although within the framework of political change, that is, in terms of impact and violence within a short time frame, it didn't match what happened in Bucharest.
The phrase the "velvet revolution" was first coined by the Vaclav Havel who led then Czechoslovakia on the road to change. As in Poland and Hungary, as well as the Baltic states and Bulgaria, change was relatively peaceful and can be classified as a process of reform. In some cases, as in Poland and Hungary, the former elites took advantage of the situation and were able to remain in positions of economic and political power, albeit under a different disguise. No longer were they the commissars of the past, but the capitalists of the future.
Other areas, however, weren't so lucky, as in the former Yugoslavia and the republics of the former Soviet Union. There civil strife took hold, both within the country and between neighbouring states. Georgia at first went down such a path, culminating in civil war and the death of thousands.
The reformers are the same elites which had come from the former regime
It was memories of such a tragic past which no doubt enabled the crowds to use such restraint when overthrowing the corrupt regime of Shevarnadzse. Yet the fact remains that most of the leaders of the opposition, who have now taken over from Shevardnadze, were themselves once supporters of the disgraced president. To this extent, many foreign observers have pondered how much really will change in Georgia now that Shevardnadze is gone.
However, taking into consideration what had gone before in other countries, Georgia is now going down a path that is not that much different from the type of change which had occurred in countries like Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary, and elsewhere. In all such cases, those who had initiated reform -- and in some cases those still holding on to the reigns of power -- are, like in Georgia, the same elites which had come from the former regime.
The reason why foreign observers are more skeptical about the situation in Georgia is because Shevardnadze was one of their favourites, and thus brought into sharp focus the hypocrisy of the west. Hence, at the beginning when parliament had just been stormed, many foreign commentators were still betting on Shevardnadze somehow surviving, referring to him as the "wily old fox" of Georgian politics. And although many admit the corruption which existed under his rule and the fact that he wasn't whiter than white, they nevertheless tended to gloss over this and instead put it down to his subordinates and the innate nature of Georgian culture.
What all countries within the former East Bloc have in common, regardless of the type of change they ended up going through in the post communist period, is that the former communists simply reinvented themselves as legitimate statesmen. Indeed, western government ended up overlooking the backgrounds of many of these characters, in some cases even raising them high on a platform in gratitude for their role in enabling the west to "win" the cold war. (e.g., Gorbachev and Shevardnadze of the former USSR, Gyula Horn of Hungary). In Germany, for example, an award was named after the Hungarian foreign minister who let the East Germans cross freely to the west, heralding the end of the so-called "Iron Curtain".
Judical vacuum
Yet while these leaders were praised by the west, back home they were actually resented and held in contempt for having sold their countries out to the west. Thus, while the west may love the likes of Gorbachev, for Russians he is seen by many as the bastard who had brought the country to ruin.
Unfortunately, a final trait shared by all these countries, and recently highlighted by the events in Georgia, is that in the end a judicial vacuum is created. Very few have ever been brought to justice for the crimes they have committed. Instead, the old leaders have all been offered an exit strategy; crimes of the past and their former reputations were forgiven or simply forgotten. This could be clearly seen in what happened to Shevarnadzse, where the opposition explicitly offered him guarantees of immunity for anything which may have occurred during his tenure in return for stepping down.
Thus, in the end, life in Georgia may turn out to be much the same as before. If so, people need to rise up and tear down the doors of parliament again and once more physically throw their leaders out from office. This is true democracy, and perhaps is something that other countries, including Britain, France, Germany, and the US, should all tke note of.